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REJECTING THE MARIE ANTOINETTE
PARADIGM OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
Royce de R. Barondes*
Let them eat cake. '
I. INTRODUCTION
A promisee is on the brink of insolvency. Its promisor, which has very good
credit - perhaps an entity whose obligations are guaranteed by the federal
government - defaults. Is the promisee made whole by receiving prejudgment
interest at the rate the market charges the promisor? The most thorough recent
analysis in the legal literature of prejudgment interest2 - an article that has
received a mixed reception in the courts3 - provides an affirmative answer.4
That rate, it is argued, properly compensates plaintiffs.5
* Associate Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law; Senior Fellow,
Contracting and Organizations Research Institute. J.D., University of Virginia; S.M. & S.B.,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The author's preparation of this Article has benefited
from the observations of Michelle Cecil, Jim Cox, Wilson Freyermuth, Jesse Fried, Ray
Hagtvedt, Cynthia McDonald and Phil Peters. Generous financial support was provided by the
L.G. "Greg" Copeland Faculty Research Fellowship, the Glenn A. McCleary Memorial Faculty
Research Fellowship, and the Donald P. Thomasson Faculty Research Fellowship.
1 RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED FROM THE
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 253 (Suzy Platt, ed., 1989) (stating quotation is commonly
attributed to Marie Antoinette, but stating the author is unknown and recounting disagreement
concerning proper attribution).
2 Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 TEx. L. REv. 293 (1996).
3 E.g., Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 144 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir.
1998) (noting that use of defendant-municipality's cost of funds is only permissible, not
mandatory); Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 950 F. Supp. 904 (E.D.
Wisc. 1996) (denying request to strike a draft of the article from the record), affd, 144 F.3d 1111
(7th Cir. 1998); Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki, 165 F. Supp. 2d 266, 286-87
(N.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting the article to the effect there would be no need for prejudgment
interest were justice immediate); Barbato v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 794 A.2d 470, 472 (R.I.
2002) (favorably referencing desirability of discounting future damages to the date of injury and
then calculating prejudgment interest on that award); Blue Ribbon Beef Co. v. Napolitano, 696
A.2d 1225, 1230 n.4 (R.I. 1997) (same).
Although not noted in the initial footnote to Knoll's piece, Knoll, supra note 2, at 293 n.*,
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The basic principle underlying this view is that prejudgment interest
essentially represents compensation for a forced investment a promisee is
required to make in the promisor.6 Thus, the promisee is made whole by having
the investment bear interest at the promisor' s cost of funds.
One might term this view the "Marie Antoinette" approach to prejudgment
interest: although the promisee expected immediate payment (bread), it should
be satisfied with later payment, bearing interest at a market rate for an
investment in the promisor (cake). If the promised substitute performance could
be transferred without transaction costs, the promisee could simply sell the claim
(cake) and get cash (use the cash to buy bread). However, even to the extent
claims can lawfully be sold,7 transaction costs cannot typically be ignored.
Claims in default are not fungible; their value depends on the existence of any
defenses. Substitution of an illiquid asset, even if properly valued, may not
make the promisee whole.
This paper develops the theoretical rationale for the conclusion suggested by
this intuition. In brief, the error is that prejudgment interest at the promisor's
cost of funds grants a promisor the ability to reallocate value from the
promisee's equityholders (or the promisee itself, in the case of an individual
promisee) to its creditors. The final extension of the analogy is perhaps strained:
the promisor gets to reallocate value among members of a family unit, from the
parents, who want bread, to the kids, who want cake.
The contribution made by this paper concerns development of the
theoretically correct computation of prejudgment interest in claims for breach of
contract between large business entities. This analysis is useful in assessing the
merits of the ways in which prejudgment interest is, in fact, calculated in
particular jurisdictions. This paper foregoes a comprehensive compilation of the
black letter law of prejudgment interest or a summary of academic commentary
concerning prejudgment interest from a doctrinal perspective, as part of an
exhaustive application of theoretical principles developed in this paper to all
contexts. That is because a compilation of the black letter law of prejudgment
interest would be prohibitively lengthy, and, given the exhaustive existing
Knoll acted as an expert for the defendant, the City of Milwaukee, in Cement Division, National
Gypsum Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 950 F. Supp. 904, 911 (E.D. Wisc. 1996) (denying request to
strike a draft of the article from the record). Consistent with the views Knoll expresses in his
article, it was the defendant's position, inter alia, that prejudgment interest should be based on
the defendant's cost of funds. Id. at 907.
4 Knoll, supra note 2, at 311.
5 Id.6 Id. at 314.
7 See Part VI, infra (discussing limits on the sale of claims).
[Vol. 43
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commentary concerning the availability of prejudgment interest in assorted
contexts,8 little would be added by recounting that here. Various factors
8 E.g., Erich H. Gaston, When Prejudgment Interest Statutes and Insurance Policy
Language Collide: Should Freedom of Contract Trump Legislative Intent?, 20 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 359 (2001) (discussing the interplay between prejudgment interest and insurance policy
limits); J. Noelle Hicks, Clearing Murky Waters: Recovering Prejudgment Interest Under the
Jones Act, 16 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 83 (2004) (in claims alleging injury or death of seamen); Karin
Mika, Lovewell v. Physicians Insurance Co.: Personal Liability for Prejudgment Interest, 45
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 723 (1997) (analyzing authority, Lovewell v. Physicians Insurance Co. of
Ohio, 679 N.E.2d 1119 (Ohio 1997), holding a medical malpractice insurer was not liable for
prejudgment interest where the insured "acting pursuant to a contract right, withholds consent to
any settlement offer by the insurer, and the trial court finds... that the party required to pay
failed to make a good faith effort to settle the case," 679 N.E.2d at 1121); Robert H. Pemberton,
A Guide to Recent Changes and New Challenges in Texas Prejudgment Interest Law, 30 TEX.
TECH L. REv. 71, 73 (1999) ("Texas prejudgment interest law has long been 'misleading,'
'illogical,' and even 'bewildering."'); Michael F. Sturley & David C. Frederick, Prejudgment
Interest in Seamen's Personal Injury Cases: Supreme Court Precedent Lost in a Sea of
Procedural Confusion, 33 J. MAR. L. & COM. 423 (2002) (claims alleging injury or death of
seamen); Richard T. Apel, Comment, Interest as Damages in California, 5 UCLA L. Rev. 262
(1958); M. Stacey Bach, Casebrief, ERISA-The Awarding of Interest as "Other Appropriate
Equitable Relief' Under ERISA: The Third Circuit Enlarges Interest Recovery in Fotta v.
Trustees of the United Mine Workers, 44 VtLE. L. REv. 807 (1999); David Gray Douglas,
Comment, The Current Status of the Availability of Prejudgment Interest in Admiralty, 17 TUL.
MAR. L.J. 283 (1993); Larry Folmar, Comment, Allowance of "Interest" on Unliquidated Tort
Damages in Pennsylvania, 75 DICK. L. REv. 79 (1970) (discussing the historical development in
Pennsylvania); Steven R. Kolodziej, Casenote, Prejudgment Interest on Antitrust Treble
Damages in Connecticut After Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit District, 19
QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 209 (2000) (discussing availability of prejudgment interest on treble
damages); Melanie Majors, Recent Development, Carnlo v. John Crane, Inc.: Second Circuit
Holds Prejudgment Interest Calculated Under Same Standard as Other Loss-Allocating Issues, 8
U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 176 (2001) (choice of law governing prejudgment interest); Russell E.
Nye, Note, Denham v. Bedford: Statutory Prejudgment Interest and its Effect on Third Party
Insurers, 1979 DETROIT C. L. REv. 345; Martin Oyos, Comment, Prejudgment Interest in South
Dakota, 33 S.D. L. Rev. 484 (1988) (providing, inter alia, a history of prejudgment interest);
Dustin K. Palmer, Comment, Should Prejudgment Interest Be a Matter of Procedural or
Substantive Law in Choice-of-Law Disputes?, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 705 (2002); Jon M. Powers,
Note, The Copyright Act of 1976 and Prejudgment Interest, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1326 (1996)
(discussing prejudgment interest on copyright infringement claims); Dean Richard, Note, "An
Award Fit for Alice in Wonderland "-Texas Allows Prejudgment Interest on Future Damages:
C&H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 149 (Nov. 24, 1993), 25 TEx. TECH L.
REv. 955 (1994) (discussing prejudgment interest on future damages); Anthony E. Rothschild,
Comment, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 192 (1982); Kent
W. Seifried, Note, Recovery of Prejudgment Interest on an Unliquidated State Claim Arising
Within the Sixth Circuit, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 152 (1977); Jeb B. Terrien, Comment, Prejudgment
Interest in General Maritime Law: A Study in Confusion, 20 TUL. MAR. L.J. 441 (1996); Joel A.
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contribute to the detail-intensive nature of the black letter law of prejudgment
interest. One type of variation among jurisdictions concerns whether
prejudgment interest is available at all. For example, prejudgment interest may
be limited to liquidated claims,9 or it may be provided on a discretionary basis.' 0
It also may be affected by settlement offers." Another dimension of the
variation involves the computation methodology. There is a wide range in the
pertinent rates. 12 The choice of rate may be discretionary, 13 and jurisdictions
vary as to whether the interest is simple or compound. 1
One manifestation of both the diversity of treatments at law and the
importance of computing prejudgment interest, as a practical matter, is the
Williams, Comment, Prejudgment Interest: An Element of Damages Not to Be Overlooked, 8
CUMB. L. REv. 521 (1977); H. Deane Wong, Prejudgment Interest: Too Little, Too Much, or
Both?, 10 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 219 (1981) (collecting authority and focusing on Alaska law).
This law review commentary is supplemented by extensive annotations. See infra notes 15-16
and accompanying text.
The principal authority in the scholarly legal literature focusing on the theoretically proper
compensatory rate is Knoll, supra note 2, and John C. Keir & Robin C. Keir, Opportunity Cost:
A Measure of Prejudgment Interest, 39 Bus. LAW. 129 (1983).
9 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 54, at 213 (1935).
McCormick formally defines liquidated claims as those in which "it [is] possible to compute the
amount with exactness, without reliance upon opinion or discretion," providing as examples
fixed sums. Id. McCormick also indicates the better result is that prejudgment interest is
available on claims "for which the measure of recovery is based upon a valuation of property or
services having a market or established current value." Id. § 55, at 217. Accord 1 DAN B.
DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.6(1), at 336 (2d ed. 1992) (identifying a general rule that,
absent statutory modification, "prejudgment interest is not recoverable on claims that are neither
liquidated as a dollar sum nor ascertainable by fixed standards"); Knoll, supra note 2, at 298
(describing this approach as the "widely rejected" common law rule). See generally
MCCORMICK, supra, § 54, at 213 (indicating the better rule is a claim is liquidated
notwithstanding dispute as to liability).
1o Douglas, supra note 8, at 292-95; Gaston, supra note 8, at 362.
11 Gaston, supra note 8, at 371-72 (citing, e.g., CAL. CivI CODE § 3291) (Deering LEXIS
through 2004 Supplement) (tort claims not against public entities); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-192a
(LEXIS through Jan. 6, 2003, Special Session) (concerning a "civil action based upon contract or
seeking the recovery of money damages"), amended by 2004 Conn. Pub. Acts 04-257, § 128,
LEXIS 2004 Ct. ALS 257); Patrick C. Diamond, Note, The Minnesota Prejudgment Interest
Amendment: An Analysis of the Offer-Counteroffer Provision, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1401, at 1406-
07, 1413 (1985) (discussing various jurisdictions).
12 See Palmer, supra note 8, at 708 (identifying default rates ranging from five percent to
twenty percent).
13 See Knoll, supra note 2, at 299-300.
14 See id. at 299 n.35 (describing simple interest as "[t]he most common incorrect
computational method"); cf. Keir & Keir, supra note 8, at 145 (concluding compound interest
should be awarded).
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extensive array of practitioner-oriented treatments of the subject. For example,
there are numerous American Law Reports annotations focusing individually on
prejudgment interest in particular types of claims or contexts, 15 in addition to
annotations examining prejudgment interest as a component of a
larger investigation. 16
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows, examining the proper
computation of prejudgment interest in breach of contract claims between large
business entities: As a threshold matter, one might argue that the choice of rate
makes no difference, because parties will simply contract around the rate
selected as a default. Part 1I briefly indicates why that is not the case - why the
default rate matters. Part III then summarizes prior theoretical analyses of the
proper selection of rates for prejudgment interest, focusing on the most
prominent, recent analysis in the legal literature, which concludes prejudgment
interest at the promisor's cost of funds should be provided.' 7
Using examples where the promisee has a higher cost of funds than the
promisor, Part IV illustrates how that approach conflates value received by
creditors and shareholders of a corporate plaintiff. It allows a creditor, in
15 E.g., Diane M. Allen, Annotation, Validity and Construction of State Statute or Rule
Allowing or Changing Rate of Prejudgment Interest in Tort Actions, 40 A.L.R.4TH 147 (1985);
Alexander C. Black, Annotation, Liability of Insurerfor Prejudgment Interest in Excess of Policy
Limits for Covered Loss, 23 A.L.R.5TH 75 (1994); J. A. Bock, Annotation, Recovery of
Prejudgment Interest on Wrongful Death Damages, 96 A.L.R.2D 1104 (1964); Alan R. Gilbert,
Annotation, Award of Prejudgment Interest in Admiralty Suits, 34 A.L.R. FED. 126 (1977);
Teresia B. Jovanovic, Annotation, Award of Prejudgment Interest Under Miller Act (40 USCS §§
270a et seq.), 66 A.L.R. FED. 901 (1984); Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Insured's Right to Recover
from Insurer Prejudgment Interest on Amount of Fire Loss, 5 A.L.R.4TH 126 (1981); J. R.
Kemper, Comment Note, Allowance of Prejudgment Interest on Builder's Recovery in Action for
Breach of Construction Contract, 60 A.L.R.3D 487 (1974); Annotation, Right to Prejudgment
Interest on Punitive or Multiple Damages Awards, 9 A.L.R.5TH 63 (1993); Danny R. Veilleux,
Annotation, Prejudgment Interest Awards in Divorce Cases, 62 A.L.R.4TH 156 (1988); Mitchell
J. Waldman, Annotation, Recovery of Prejudgment Interest in Actions Under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act or Jones Act, 80 A.L.R. FED. 185 (1986).
16 E.g., Laura T. Kidwell, Annotation, State Offer of Judgment Rule-Construction,
Operation, and Effect of Acceptance and Resulting Judgment, 120 A.L.R.5TH 779, § 6 (2004);
Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Allowance and Rates of Interest on Backpay Award Under Title
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCS §§ 2000e et seq.), 138 A.L.R. FED. 1, §§ 3-4, 6-10
(1997); William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Measure and Elements of Damages for Lessee's
Breach of Covenant as to Repairs, 45 A.L.R.5TH 251, § 32 (1997); Martha M. Cleary,
Annotation, Remedies Under Civil Liabilities Provision of § 12 of Securities Act of 1933 (15
USCS § 771), 110 A.L.R. FED. 97, § 6[a] (1992).
17 Knoll, supra note 2, at 311.
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default, to reallocate value from the promisee' s shareholders to the promisee' s
creditors, ultimately undercompensating shareholders. Part V then examines
circumstances where the promisor has a higher cost of funds than does the
promisee, and concludes that prejudgment interest at the promisor's cost of
funds may overcompensate promisees. The basic principle is that the promisor' s
cost of funds reflects both the risk of a short-term default plus the incremental
increase in risk arising from postponed payment. However, providing
prejudgment interest to compensate for the former (short-term default risk)
produces hyper-complexity in prejudgment interest and may result in
overcompensation of promisees.
For ease of illustration, those examples and analyses are focused on
promisees and promisors with simple financial structures - unsecured debt and
common stock. The analyses in Parts IV and V are based on a hypothetical
covering transaction funded by an unsecured loan from a third party. Part VI
refines those analyses by examining the possibility that a promisee could sell the
claim or fund a covering transaction with nonrecourse debt.
II. IMPORTANCE OF THE CORRECT RATE - IT Is NOT SIMPLY PRICED-IN
This paper explores the proper rate at which prejudgment interest should be
granted in claims for breach of contract between large business entities, starting
from the assumption that the goal is to provide proper compensation to a
plaintiff, probing the validity of prior analyses. As a preliminary matter, one
might assert that the rate of prejudgment interest is "priced-in" to contracts and,
therefore, the rate selected by the law makes no difference.
For familiar reasons, there are a few problems with that analysis. First,
there is no bargaining at all for some plaintiffs - many are tort claimants - and
improper computation of prejudgment interest may reallocate value among tort
and contract claimants.' 8  Second, if prejudgment interest introduces
unnecessary complexity in predicting, at contract formation, the potential
outcomes upon subsequent default, that imposes wasteful expenditures to assess
possible outcomes. It also may introduce unnecessary risk in contracting,
imposing cost by needlessly increasing uncertainty as to the outcome upon
18 Similar observations are made in connection with assessing priority of tort claimants
against insolvent debtors. E.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditors'Bargain, 80 VA. L.
REV. 1887, 1897-98, 1963 (1994) (asserting the existence of involuntary creditors, such as tort
claimants, may explain the existence of secured debt and concluding, "Involuntary creditors
should have priority over voluntary creditors, whether secured or unsecured.").
[Vol. 43
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subsequent default. Third, variation between parties in terms of their ability to
predict the likelihood of default means pricing-in the cost does not produce an
equivalent outcome. An efficient outcome allocates risks to a party better able
to assess or control those risks.19 A promisor is generally better able to assess
and control the likelihood of its own default. Even if the cost of insufficient
prejudgment interest is priced-in, that outcome would be inferior to one in
which properly computed prejudgment interest is provided. It could yield
undesirable risk allocations.
Even for parties that can opt out of defaults, the default rules matter.
Traditional theory supports defaults reflecting the bargain the parties would
have reached had they been express about the point,20 because there are costs to
negotiate out of a default provided by law. 21 These transaction costs will
impede some parties in opting-out of a default rule that fails to provide
appropriate compensation for prejudgment interest.
In sum, concerns with undercompensatory or overcompensatory
prejudgment interest cannot be dismissed on the basis that claimants will have
priced-in the inadequate remedy. It can provide suboptimal outcomes that some
will not opt-out of, because of transaction costs, and, more generally, may
reallocate value among parties with varying abilities to negotiate
around defaults.
19 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 97, 106 (6th ed. 2003)
(illustrating control over risk as a basis for allocation of its consequences and identifying as a
factor in determining the cheaper insurer (i.e., risk-bearer) the ability to measure the risk).
20 E.g., id. at 96 ('The task for a court asked to interpret a contract to cover a contingency
that the parties did not provide for is to imagine how the parties would have provided for it had
they thought to do so."); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a
General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 971 (1983) ("Ideally, the
preformulated rules supplied by the state should mimic the agreements contracting parties would
reach were they costlessly to bargain out each detail of the transaction."). But see, e.g., Ian Ayres
& Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules,
101 YALE L.J. 729, 733 (1992) ("These results strengthen the growing consensus among contract
scholars that default rules should not simply be the hypothetical contract that parties would
choose in a world without transaction costs. The hypothetical contract standard fails to account
for the inefficiencies that can be caused by strategic bargaining under conditions of asymmetric
information and how these inefficiencies depend upon, and can be exacerbated by, the costs of
contracting around a given default rule. When the parties have symmetric information, the
hypothetical contract standard yields efficient results. When the parties have asymmetric
information, however, the hypothetical contract standard fails to provide an effective framework
for choosing efficient rules." (footnote omitted)).
21 Cf Ayres & Gertner, supra note 20, at 732 (proposing irrelevance of default rule where it
is well-known and the parties can opt out of the default without cost).
HeinOnline  -- 43 Brandeis L.J. 7 2004-2005
BRANDEIS LAW JOURNAL
For complex reasons, one may argue a default that does not provide proper
compensation should be adopted. Ayres and Gertner's "penalty default" 22 is a
prominent candidate. Yet even if one seeks to provide undercompensatory or
overcompensatory prejudgment interest, as part of a complex, putatively
efficient mechanism, a preliminary step in the development of the proper rate
would be identification of the fully compensatory rate. Determining what is the
fully compensatory rate of prejudgment interest is thus an important part of any.
attempt to examine the merits of a particular proposed rate of prejudgment
interest, even if the goal is to provide overcompensatory or
undercompensatory interest.
I1. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IN THE LITERATURE
Focusing on litigation between large corporate commercial actors, recent
literature includes three general categories of conclusions concerning the
method for computing prejudgment interest: the defendant's borrowing cost, the
plaintiff s cost of funds, and the risk-free rate. The theoretical development of,
and support for, each of the three approaches seems plausible.
A. Defendant's Borrowing Cost
The most comprehensive discussion in the legal literature of the theoretical
principles for setting prejudgment interest rates is provided by Knoll.23 He
argues the proper treatment requires providing prejudgment interest at the
defendant's cost of borrowing, at least where the defendant and the plaintiff are
large firms with access to the capital markets. 24 His theory is that the defendant
has essentially made a forced loan to the plaintiff.25 The underlying concept is
that the market essentially accurately prices debt obligations. Therefore, if
prejudgment interest is at the defendant's cost of borrowing, that turns
prejudgment interest into an investment (albeit an involuntary one) that is
properly priced.26
22 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). Recounting the vast literature on theory of setting
default rules is beyond the scope of this paper.
23 Knoll, supra note 2.
24 Id. at 305, 310-11.
21 Id. at 314.
26 Various details arising in the specification of interest rates are thoroughly addressed by
Knoll, supra note 2, e.g., seniority of the referenced interest rate, the time horizon, tax
[Vol. 43
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Knoll rejects using the plaintiff's cost of borrowing, arguing that, where the
plaintiff's cost of borrowing is less than that of the defendant, providing
prejudgment interest at the plaintiffs lower rate does not compensate the
27plaintiff for risk of nonpayment. He also argues it is improper to use the
plaintiff s cost of borrowing in the converse case, where the plaintiff s cost of
borrowing is higher than that of the defendant:
The plaintiff's borrowing rate on the withheld funds would not exceed the
defendant's if the hypothetical lender to the plaintiff were assured of payment
in the event that the defendant pays the plaintiff. The hypothetical lender,
however, is not so assured, conditional on the judgment being paid, because
other clainholders in the plaintiff also have a right to share in the award.
Hence, they too will benefit from the award because they might receive a
larger payment than otherwise. Thus, awarding prejudgment interest at the
plaintiffs cost of borrowing will overcompensate the plaintiff.
28
29
An earlier analysis by Patell et al. concludes that, where the claim is
transferable, it should bear interest at the defendant's cost of funds.3 ° On the
other hand, they develop a somewhat complex model in which a risk-averse
plaintiff needs greater compensation where the claim cannot be sold.3'
B. The Plaintiffs Cost of Funds
Keir and Keir focus on the injury to the plaintiff arising from the litigation
delay. They argue that where the plaintiff is a business, the rate of prejudgment
32interest should be at least the plaintiffs cost of capital. They reference the
consequences and multiple defendants who are jointly and severally liable. Those details are not
addressed in this paper.27 Id. at 314-15.
28 Id. at 315 (footnote omitted).
29 James M. Patell et al., Accumulating Damages in Litigation: The Roles of Uncertainty
and Interest Rates, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 341 (1982).
30 Id. at 354.
31 Id. at 357-62.
32 Keir & Keir, supra note 8, at 151-52. Keir and Keir also conclude that where a business
plaintiff's historical rate of return is higher, prejudgment interest can properly be set up to that
rate. Id. at 152. Escher and Krueger similarly focus on the plaintiffs cost of carrying the assets.
Susan Escher & Kurt Krueger, The Cost of Carry and Prejudgment Interest, 6 LITIG. ECON.
REv. 12, 16 (2003). Ault and Rutman, in a brief piece, raise the issue of whether prejudgment
interest should be calculated to compensate for "loss of control over the use of... funds." David
E. Ault & Gilbert L. Rutman, The Calculation of Damage Awards: The Issue of "Prejudgment
Interest," 12 J. FORENSIc EcON, 97, 104 (1999).
2004-05]
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firm's weighted average cost of capital, based on its cost of debt, common stock,
and preferred stock.33
For ease of exposition, the distinction between the firm's cost of debt and its
weighted average cost of capital is disregarded in this paper. Except where the
claim in question is relatively large, one would expect promisees to look to their
existing lines of credit, or other sources of borrowed funds, to cover the claim in
question, as opposed to selling stock. Ultimately, firm-specific factors will
materially influence how a claim is covered in particular cases.
Lanzillotti and Esquibel reach a conclusion somewhat similar to Keir and
Keir, concluding without a detailed discussion that, where the plaintiff was a net
borrower in the prejudgment period, prejudgment interest should be based on
the plaintiffs cost of borrowing.34
Keir and Keir also examine whether prejudgment interest based on the
defendant's cost of funds, representing the defendant's profit arising from the
time delay of litigation, should be awarded. They assert that as it represents an
approach sounding in restitution, it should not be available where the underlying
claim is legal - but available where the action is in equity.35
C. Risk-Free Rate
Fisher and Romaine assert prejudgment interest should be at the risk-free
rate.36 They consider two plaintiffs with different borrowing costs. They argue
that to give a higher rate of prejudgment interest to one "is to forget that his
higher average rate of return compensates him for the risk associated with his
investments .... The asset destroyed might perfectly well have been employed
in an unsuccessful venture; that risk has not been borne." 37 They further assert,
"[S]ince that higher rate stems from causes having nothing to do with the
violation, there is no reason why [the one with the higher cost of funds] should
be compensated at a higher rate than [the other]. 38
33 Keir & Keir, supra note 8, at 147-48.
'4 R.F. Lanzilotti & A.K. Esquibel, Measuring Damages in Commercial Litigation: Present
Value of Lost Opportunities, 5 J. AccT. AUDITING & FIN. 125, 139 (New Series 1990).
35 See Keir & Keir, supra note 8, at 140-41.
36 Franklin M. Fisher & Craig R. Romaine, Janis Joplin's Yearbook and the Theory of
Damages, 5 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 145, 146 (New Series 1990).
" Id. at 146-47.38 Id. at 147 n.4.
[Vol. 43
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D. Intuition for Choosing Among Theories
Each of these analyses seems plausible. Four insights are useful in
developing an intuitive sense in selecting among these approaches. The
intuition is first discussed in the remainder of this Part, and then, in Parts IV and
V, illustrated with quantitative examples.
The first insight is to distinguish among corporate constituencies. Paring
down Knoll's language, focusing on the constituency one has in mind
illuminates the problem with Knoll's analysis. As to awarding interest at the
plaintiffs cost of borrowing, he asserts: "[O]ther claimholders in the
plaintiff.., will benefit from the award .... Thus, awarding prejudgment
interest at the plaintiff s cost of borrowing will overcompensate the plaintiff.,39
The discussion erroneously equates "other claimholders" with the plaintiff itself.
The second insight involves incremental increases in risk of ultimate
nonpayment arising from postponed payment. Assume a promised performance
is due at Time 1, having a value if rendered immediately of $100. The promisor
defaults, litigation ensues and judgment is entered at Time 2. One can
conceptualize the value to the promisee, as of Time 1, of the promise as being
the product of four separate factors: (i) $100, the face value of performance; (ii)
the promisor' s financial solvency at Time 1; (iii) the incremental increase in the
risk the promisor will become insolvent from Time 1 to Time 2; and (iv) the
value of having money at Time I as opposed to Time 2. The face value of the
promise due may reflect part of the default risk, estimated at the time the
contract was formed. For example, if I default on my mortgage loan at Time 1,
the payment due will reflect the lender's assessment, at the time the loan was
extended, that I would default. If prejudgment interest is based on the risk of
solvency at Time 2, without adjustment for any portion of the default risk
reflected in the amount due, providing prejudgment interest based on the
promisor's cost of funds includes some double-counting. As developed more
fully below, a thoughtful resolution would exclude from computation of
prejudgment interest the amount the promisor pays, at Time 1, on short-term
borrowing attributable to default risk.
This insight allows rejection of the view expressed by Keir and Keir, that
prejudgment interest reflecting the promisor's default risk should not be
provided where the underlying claim is legal. 40 Litigation provides a promisor
the option to postpone payment, which may increase the likelihood that the
39 Knoll, supra note 2, at 315 (emphasis added).
40 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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promisee will not be paid in full. That increased risk is a component of the
promisor' s cost of borrowing. Providing compensation based on (a component
of) that cost of borrowing is not, then, divorced from properly compensating the
promisee, as is suggested by their dichotomous treatment of claims at law and
those in equity. The notion that prejudgment interest reflecting the promisor's
default risk should be restricted to claims that are not at law is, therefore,
erroneous. Accounting for that increased risk may be required to compensate a
promisee fully, and can be fully consistent with the goal of a remedy at law to
compensate a promisee fully.
The third insight allows rejection of the Fisher and Romaine proposal to
reference the risk-free rate. Their assertion, "[Slince that higher rate stems from
causes having nothing to do with the violation, there is no reason why [the one
with the higher cost of funds] should be compensated at a higher rate than [the
other], ' is inconsistent with basic elements of damage computations.
Attributes of plaintiffs are frequently taken into account in ascertaining
damages, whether in tort, e.g., the "eggshell skull" plaintiff,42 or in contract,
43
e.g., consequential damages. Perhaps most apposite is a breach of an
obligation to lend, where it is not at all controversial to conclude damages are
based on the borrower's cost of acquiring substitute funds.44
Along similar lines, the limitation proposed by Lanzilotti and Esquibel,
limiting the plaintiffs recovery based on its cost of funds to circumstancesS45
where it was a net borrower in the prejudgment period, does not seem correct.
Even if the plaintiff's outstanding debt remained constant in the prejudgment
period, where the debt could have been prepaid without penalty, the defendant's
failure to pay immediately on breach would deprive the promisee of this option.
41 Fisher & Romaine, supra note 36, at 147 n.4.42 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THELAWOFTORTS § 43, at 291-92
(5th ed. 1984) (discussing the "eggshell skull" rule).
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(b) (1981).
44 E.g., Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Paull, 293 F.2d 389,397 (8th Cir. 1961) (applying
Arkansas law); Rubin v. Pioneer Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 334 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Neb. 1983);
Pipkin v. Thomas & Hill, Inc., 258 S.E.2d 778, 787 (N.C. 1979); Sparks v. Farmers Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 395 S.E.2d 559, 561 (W. Va. 1990); Bridgkort Racquet Club, Inc v. Univ. Bank,
271 N.W.2d 165, 169 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978) (present value of difference); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 cmt. e (1981) (noting, however, foreseeable lost profits may be
recovered where alternative funding is unavailable). See generally DebraT. Landis, Annotation,
Measure and Elements of Damages for Breach of Contract to Lend Money, 4 A.L.R.4TH 682, § 5
(1981 & Supp. 2002) (collecting cases supporting a recovery comprising the increased cost of a
substitute loan).
45 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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The breach, of course, frequently will prevent definitive proof of what the
promisee would have done absent breach.
For purposes of this paper, the discussion focuses on the promisee's cost of
funds, without exploring the details where there is a discrepancy between the
rate of current debt the promisee could prepay and the rate at which the
promisee would, at that point in time, be required to agree to pay for a loan
extended at that time. Focusing on that level of detail would obscure the basic
points being made in this paper.
A fourth insight in assessing these alternative analyses comes from
examining the finance of "forward" contracts. A forward contract is an
agreement in which persons agree to buy or sell a particular item46 at a specified
time in the future at a price (the delivery price) specified when the contract is
formed. One can derive the delivery price in the forward contract such that a
party would neither demand nor be required to pay additional consideration to
enter into the forward contract. If there is no risk of non-performance by either
party, the delivery price in a forward contract will equal the spot (current) price
for the property subject to the forward contract, increased by hypothetical
interest on that amount at the risk-free rate over the time when delivery is due.4 7
Escher and Krueger note absence of payment immediately upon breach can
be conceptualized as causing the promisor and the promisee to have entered into
48a forward contract whose underlying asset is the claim against the promisor.
We also can now identify one reason why Fisher and Romaine's approach is
incorrect - a concern as to which Escher and Krueger are not explicit. The
default creates a forward contract with a principal that is not necessarily risk-
free. The pricing contemplated by Fisher and Romaine requires there be no
46 It is assumed in this discussion that the item does not produce income, e.g., dividends, or
suffer physical depreciation, over the time-period in question. Adjusting for that possibility
makes the algebra more complex, without affecting the intuition.
47 See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVE SECURITIES 51 (2d ed.
1993). The intuition is that if the delivery price for the forward contract were higher, then a firm
that can borrow at the risk-free rate would immediately (i) buy the property at the spot price, (ii)
fund the purchase with a loan at the risk-free rate, and (iii) enter into the forward contract,
agreeing to sell the property at the time the contract matured-profiting at the time the contract
matured equal to the difference between the delivery price and the spot price at the time the
contract was entered into plus interest on that amount at the risk-free rate.
Confirming the price in a forward contract cannot be lower than the spot price increased by
the hypothetical interest at the risk-free rate is a little more complex. See id. at 51-52.
48 Escher & Krueger, supra note 32, at 14.
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incremental increase in default risk arising from the duration of the
forward contract.
A different error in Fisher and Romaine's approach is identified by Escher
and Krueger.49 Without focusing on the allocation of value among
constituencies, they assert the plaintiff needs compensation for "cost of carry."
The focus on constituencies, referenced above,50 explains the second component
of the problem with Fisher and Romaine's approach: if the plaintiff cannot sell
the claim for its value, it can be frozen into an investment that shifts value to its
creditors from its shareholders.
IV. SHIFTING VALUE AMONG CONSTITUENCIES - REJECTION OF KNOLL'S
APPROACH
Although the principles articulated in the preceding Parts highlight concerns
with prior analyses, it is helpful to provide numerical illustrations. Turning first
to Knoll's analysis, it clearly is elegant. Yet his conclusion that prejudgment
interest should be at the promisor's cost of funds is counterintuitive. Assume a
firm is borrowing funds currently at a high annual rate of interest, for example,
twenty-three percent (a rate used in an example below) and the firm is the
promisee of a contractual obligation in breach. The promisee's current
borrowing at twenty-three percent would seem to prove conclusively that the
firm has uses for its money promising a return greater than twenty-three percent.
Otherwise, it would not be borrowing at that rate.
A promisor ordinarily does not have a right to change unilaterally a
promisee's portfolio of investments.51 If the promisee is entitled to the bargain
it struck, the fact that the market as a whole properly prices the promisor' s debt,
and is willing to extend the promisor a loan on favorable terms, does not excuse
substitution of assets. Consider, for example, a person who, thirty years before
retirement, sought a higher-yield security as a retirement investment. The
41d. at 10-11.
50 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
51 There is some similarity between Knoll's approach and the facts of Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). In Metropolitan Life,
the holders of bonds claimed the issuer's engaging in a leveraged buyout, which increased the
leverage of the issuer, thereby decreasing the value of the bonds, violated implied obligations to
the bondholders. The bondholders were therefore seeking to prevent the issuer from changing
the risk of debt claims against the issuer. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant
on claims alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith, frustration of purpose,
unconscionability and a theory akin to breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 1516, 1522, 1526.
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investor might well find it cold comfort to learn, upon retirement, that the
selected investment had been replaced thirty years ago with a lower-yield, albeit
a properly priced, riskless security.
52
Selection of the constituencies for whose benefit a corporation is to be
managed is a basic principle not emphasized in prior commentary on
prejudgment interest. A corporation ordinarily is managed for the benefit of the
shareholders, not for the benefit of its creditors or the firm as a whole.53 The last
two sentences of Knoll's discussion quoted above54 assert that a plaintiff is
overcompensated by receiving prejudgment interest at its cost of funds, because
other claimholders could be made better off. Knoll's approach therefore
countenances giving a promisor the power, by default, to reallocate value among
its promisee's corporate constituencies.
A few quantitative examples illustrate that Knoll's approach sanctions
allowing a promisor by breach to change the aggregate risk of the promisee's
assets, thereby reallocating value among the promisee's shareholders and
creditors, to the detriment of the shareholders. This discussion is premised on
an understanding that prejudgment interest is designed to compensate the
52 See, e.g., Scalp & Blade, Inc. v. Advest, Inc., 765 N.Y.S.2d 92, 101-02 (N.Y.A.D. 2003)
(allowing damages, in case alleging improper churning, unsuitable investments or unauthorized
trading, based on the overall market performance, to be proved by reference to a market index);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 611, 648-50 (1985) (asserting the actual harm in non-churning unauthorized trading
resulting in asset substitution arises from changes in risk).
53 This statement represents the traditional understanding of the role of directors and
officers. E.g., Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or How Investor
Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 Bus. LAW. 429,430 (1998); Alon Chaver & Jesse M.
Fried, Managers' Fiduciary Duty upon the Firm's Insolvency: Accounting for Performance
Creditors, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1813, 1814 (2002); Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for
Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 214
(1999) ("Now the orthodox view among corporate law scholars is that the corporate fiduciary
duty is a norm that requires firm managers to 'maximize shareholder value.' "); see 3 WILLIAM
MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 849 (2002
rev. vol.) (rejecting a general duty of directors to creditors). This principle is not absolute, as
managers may be authorized, although generally not required, to consider the impact of corporate
actions on other constituencies. Cf Booth, supra, at 432-33 (citing very limited authority for an
obligation to consider interests of other constituencies). Insolvency or distress short of
insolvency can affect the constituencies fiduciary duties require be considered. E.g., Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civil Action No. 12150, 1991 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 215 (Dec. 30, 1991); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency:
Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1993).
54 See supra text accompanying note 39.
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plaintiff, as opposed to some other alternative, e.g., punishing the defendant or
creating incentives for settlement, and that the claim cannot be immediately sold
on default, the latter assumption being reviewed below.55 Lastly, to avoid
distractions presented by the process of enforcing a judgment, it is assumed
payments are made when judgment is entered, to the extent the defendant has
the required funds.
Consider first a simplified example that assumes a risk-free rate of zero:
Example 1: Assume a breach of contract at Time 0. The promisor can
borrow at the risk-free rate, zero.56 At Time 0, the promisee P requires
$9.50 to cover the breached obligation. A lender funds that
transaction; the lender is to be repaid at Time 1, the time when
judgment is entered.
There is a risk P will not have sufficient assets to repay the loan, so the
lender requires that P agree to pay the lender something more than
$9.50 at some future time. To simplify the illustration further, assume
it is known the lender will be either paid in full or, with a ten percent
probability, the promisee P becomes insolvent, and the lender recovers
fifty percent of what it is due.
The lender will require P promise to pay $10 at Time 1, which results in the
expected value of the lender's claim being $9.50. The principal amount of the
claim P has against the promisor is $9.50. The prejudgment interest necessary
to make P whole can be easily calculated. In the nine times out of ten that P
will not be in default at Time 1, the equity is valuable. P needs to receive $10
from the original promisor - to fund the $10 payment to the lender- if P is to be
made whole.
Even if there is no risk the original promisor will become insolvent, the
claim against the original promisor is unconditional, and the risk-free rate is
zero, then the original promisor still must agree to pay interest of $0.50 (5.3%).
15 See infra Part VI.56 The example contemplates a party that can borrow at the risk-free rate not fulfilling its
contractual obligation. That is not inherently inconsistent. Obligations of the federal
government, for example, are considered riskless, in the sense of the promisor having assets
sufficient to discharge the obligations being assumed, although the federal government does not
necessarily perform its contractual obligations, and a promisee may therefore need to sue the
federal government. E.g., Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United States,
530 U.S. 604 (2000) (granting restitution of funds paid the federal government for oil
exploration lease contracts); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (obligations
arising from private acquisitions of failing thrift institutions).
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This is the same amount P pays the lender that funds the covering transaction, in
order to compensate P fully. That is the case, even though the original promisor
can borrow at the risk-free rate (in this case, zero).
Of course, in this example, one time out of ten, the additional $0.50 inures
to the benefit of P's creditors.
A second, more detailed example demonstrates that the result does not
depend on the risk-free rate being zero. It also provides more detail of the
impact of reallocation of value among security-holders and creditors:
Example 2: On January 1 of year 1, A has $100 and no liabilities. A
borrows $200 from a bank, Bank 1, promising to repay the funds on
January 1 of year 2. A agrees with Bank 1 that A will make two $100
investments on January 1 of year 1, one in S and one in S2. Each
investment will have a 50% probability of paying $210 on January 1 of
year 2 and a 50% probability of paying nothing. The contingencies are
independent of each other. The risk-free rate of interest is 5% per year.
Each of SI and S2 is "riskless," in the sense of being assured of having
assets sufficient to discharge its obligations. Therefore, each investment
can be made on January 1 of year 1 for $100. 57
In addition, A agrees with Bank I that A will invest $100 in a riskless
asset, paying 5% per year, maturing on January 1 of year 2.
On January 1 of year 1, immediately after A makes payments to S1 and
S2, S2 repudiates. A borrows an additional $100 from a second bank,
Bank 2, and covers the repudiated promise.
At the time Bank 1 is considering the possibility of extending credit, it is
likely to price the loan based on three possible outcomes on January 1 of
year 2:58
a. probability: 0.25: The investments in S1 and S2 are successful. A
has received an aggregate of $420 from S1 and S2, and $105 from the
57 That is because the present value, as of January 1 of year 1, of $210 to be received on
January 1 of year 2 is $200. Thus, the present value of each investment on January 1 of year I is
0.5 x $200, or $100.
58 Bank I might also consider the possibility S1 or S2 would breach. As shown below, see
infra note 62, a breach and cover shifts value to Bank 1, by decreasing the risk of an investment
in A, through inclusion of additional risk-free assets. However, Bank 1 is not likely to reduce the
rate A is obligated to pay, because the bank is unlikely to be able to assess the likelihood of
that breach.
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proceeds of the riskless investment of $100 for one year. A also has a
liability to Bank 1 of $200 plus interest.
b. probability: 0.5: One risky investment is successful and one is not. A
has received $210 from either S1 or S2. A also has received $105 from
the proceeds of the riskless investment of $100 for one year. In
addition, A has a liability to Bank 1 of $200 plus interest.
c. probability: 0.25: Neither the investment in S nor that in S2 is
successful. A has assets of $105 and a liability to Bank I of $200 plus
interest.
A little algebra yields Bank I will charge interest of 22.5%. 59
The discussion can now proceed to the consequences of S2's breach. The
point is to demonstrate that if A immediately covers and A has a higher cost of
borrowing than S2, obligating S2 (the promisor) to pay prejudgment interest at
S2's cost of funds, as opposed to A's (the promisee's) cost of funds,
undercompensates A, shifting value to its creditors.
Let us first assume A funds its covering transaction with unsecured debt, an
assumption that will be examined below.60 Also assume it will take a year to
litigate the dispute between A and S2, there are no costs of litigation, and S2 is
obligated to pay interest at its cost of funds - the risk-free rate. A borrows funds
from Bank 2 to finance a covering transaction and covers with the proceeds.
Bank 2 may charge A a lower interest rate than Bank 1 did, because A's portfolio
of assets, which now includes the right to receive compensation from S2, has
declined in risk. It will be costly for A to benefit fully from the lower rate of
interest, because that would require Bank 2 to become fully informed of the
likelihood that A has a valid claim against S2. Yet even if Bank 2 is fully
59 The rate can be computed as follows: Assume the interest rate is not more than 57.5%, or
$115 on the $200 loan. In that case, Bank I will receive principal plus interest in full, as long as
at least one of the investments in S1 and S2 is successful. (That is because A will have assets of
at least $315 and liabilities of $200 plus interest. Thus, Bank 1 can receive up to $115, or
57.5%, in interest.) Thus, in exchange for $200, the bank will receive in one year:
(i) with a probability of 75%, $200 plus i x $200, where i represents the interest rate; or
(ii) with a probability of 25%, $105.
Each of these payments will be received in one year, and they therefore have to be
discounted by a factor of 1/1.05, or 0.952. Thus, $200 = 0.952 ($150 + i x $150 + $26.25);
or i = 22.5%.
60 See infra, Part VI.
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informed and reduces the interest rate to the correct rate, in this case, 17.33%
per annum, 61 the value of A's equity decreases.
That can be illustrated as follows: before the default, the aggregate value of
A's equity and the value of Bank I's loan was $300. S2's repudiation has
substituted a claim against S2 at the risk-free rate for its promised performance.
By substituting something of equivalent value, the aggregate value of A's equity
and the value of Bank I's loan must remain unchanged at $300. Similarly, if the
loan from Bank 2 is properly priced, the loan will not decrease the aggregate
value of A's equity and Bank I's claim. So, after the loan from Bank 2, the
aggregate value of A's equity and the rights of Bank I in A remains $300 - the
value before S2's default. If the interest rate is properly set in this kind of
stylized illustration, it should neither increase nor decrease the value of all
interests in A for A to borrow funds. A decrease in aggregate value of all rights
in A (A's shareholders and creditors) would mean value had been "lost"
somewhere in the transaction, and an increase would mean value had
been created.
Although the aggregate value of the rights of Bank I in A and A's equity has
not changed, S2' s default has shifted value from A's equity to Bank 1. After that
default and A's cover, Bank I's loan has a present value, on January 1 of year 1,
of $209 (increasing from $200), and there has been a corresponding decrease in
61 The rationale for that conclusion is as follows: after that covering transaction, A now has
assets comprising: (i) a $100 investment in SI; (ii) a $100 covering investment in a third party;
(iii) a $100 riskless investment, with 5% interest, and payable in one year; and (iv) the right to
receive compensation of $105 in one year from S2.
At that time, A has liabilities in an aggregate face amount of $300, $200 owed to Bank I and
$100 owed to Bank 2. One year later, Bank 2 will be paid in full if either the investment in S1 or
the investment covering S2's breach is successful (pays $105). If one of those two investments is
successful, A will have assets at that time of $210 (the proceeds of one successful investment) +
$105 (the return on the riskless investment) + $105 (payment from S2 for breach), or $420. It
will have liabilities of $245 to Bank 1 ($200 plus 22.5% interest) and $100 plus interest to Bank
2. As long as the interest owed to Bank 2 is less than $420-$245- 100, or $75 (75%), then Bank 2
will be paid in full if at least one of the two investments is successful.
If neither investment is successful, in one year, A will have assets of $210 (the return on the
riskless investment plus the payment from S2 for breach), and liabilities of $245 to Bank 1, as
well as its liability to Bank 2. That Bank 2 will charge 17.33% (a rate less than the 75% assumed
in the preceding paragraph) can be confirmed by noting that, if it charges that rate, the expected
future value to be received by Bank 2 in one year is $105, computed as follows:
105=0.751117.33]+0.25 210 1[ 2 45 + 1 17 .33
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the present value of A's equity, as of January 1, year 1, to $91 (from $100).62 If
transaction costs prevented Bank 2's becoming fully informed, and Bank 2 did
not fully account for the increased risk of a loan, there would be an additional
adverse impact on A's equityholders.
Only increasing the interest rate paid by S2 to the rate being paid to Bank 2
would result in an increase in the value retained by A sufficient to preserve A's
pre-repudiation value of $100. Although the arithmetic to determine the rate is
somewhat tedious, if the prejudgment interest rate paid by S2 is 16.26%, which
is well above the hypothesized risk-free rate, Bank 2, if fully informed, will
charge a rate of 16.26%. In that case, the value of A's equity on January 1 of
year 1 remains $100 after the default by S2 and A's cover.6 3
These simple examples illustrate that, if the promisee's cost of borrowing in
covering the transaction in default is higher than the promisor's cost of funds,
payment of prejudgment interest at a defaulting promisor's cost of funds can
undercompensate the promisee by shifting value from the promisee to its
creditors. That can happen even if a third party funding a covering transaction
is perfectly (and costlessly) informed about the value of the claim against the
promisor. If the third party funding a coveing transaction is not so informed,
the adverse impact on the promisee's equity may be even greater.
V. DECOMPOSING THE PROMISOR'S COST OF FUNDS
A. Decomposing the Cost of Funds
The second insight that raises concerns with Knoll's approach, and the
earlier analysis of Patell et al., which concludes a transferable claim should bear
62 That can be confirmed as follows: The calculations in note 61, supra, demonstrate the
creditors will be paid in full unless both investments are unsuccessful. If both investments are
unsuccessful, then the value of A's equity (A's value) will be zero. There is a 25% chance both
investments will be unsuccessful. The value of A can therefore be computed by reference to the
25% probability that both investments will be successful (giving A gross assets of $210 + $210 +
$105 + $105, in the order the assets are listed in note 61, supra, or $630) and the 75%
probability that only one investment will be successful (giving A gross assets of $420). That
conclusion produces a $91 valuation of A (rounded):
{0.251630- 245- 117] + 0.5[420- 245-117]1}/1.05
63 {0.25 [641.26- 245-116.26]+ 0.5[431.26- 245- 116.26]1 / 1.05= 100
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interest at the defendant's cost of funds,64 is the possibility of double-counting
the risk of an investment in the promisor, if there is a possibility the promisor
may become insolvent.65 That can be illustrated with a third example:
Example 3: B and C enter into a contract, in which B delivers property
with a value of $100 to C at Time 0. C is to render performance at Time
1. There is a ninety percent chance C will be solvent at Time 1, and
there is a ten percent chance C will have assets at that time sufficient to
discharge one-half its liabilities. The risk-free rate of return is zero.
For B to enter into this contract, the value of the promised performance at
Time I must be $105.26. 66
Consider the following three possible subsequent developments:
(i) C renders performance worth $105.26 at Time 1.
(ii) C defaults shortly before Time 1, e.g., breaches a covenant,
accelerating payment, at a time when it is not yet clear whether C will be
able to discharge all its liabilities at Time 1, and B sues, and, when the
lawsuit is initiated, there has not yet been any change in the likelihood C
will be insolvent at Time 1.
(iii) C defaults at Time 1.
The question is whether the value of B's claim - the amount owed B at Time
I in each of these three cases - should be the same. If the claim bears interest
based on C's cost of funds, in circumstance (ii), B's claim, at Time 1, after
adding prejudgment interest, would be $110.80. In that case, if C were solvent
at Time 1, B would be paid the risk premium twice.
The question is then whether that is a sensible result. It is not. If the law
followed that approach, at the time the contract was initially formed, the parties
could estimate the likelihood there would be a default at or before Time 1. They
could then, at the time of contract formation, try to adjust downward the value
64 See Patell et. al., supra note 29, at 354 and accompanying text.
65 Knoll looks at the more limited possibility that the claim itself, were it paid immediately,
would bankrupt the defendant. Knoll, supra note 2, at 343-45. After noting difficulty resolving
that circumstance, he asserts, "Perhaps it is best to say that the analysis in this Article deals with
the case in which the judgment would not have thrown the corporation into bankruptcy had it
been paid immediately." Id. at 344-45. That approach, however, omits any adjustment for the
possibility of an insolvency in the short term that would not be precipitated by payment of the
claim itself.
66 (0.9 X 105.26) + (0.1 x 105.26 / 2) = 100
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of C's promised performance, to reflect the possibility of default before full
maturation of the possibility of insolvency and a resulting increase - the value
received by B through prejudgment interest. The problem with that approach is
that it is not practicable. The promisee is unlikely to be able to ascribe a value
to that possibility.
In sum, providing for prejudgment interest based on the promisor's cost of
funds at the time of default produces hyper-complexity in pricing default at the
contract formation stage. That is not a desirable result, and is one that is likely
not to reflect the basis on which the parties actually price transactions.
These stylized illustrations are being provided without incorporating
provisions of bankruptcy law, which ultimately reallocate value. For example,
the bankruptcy code limits a real property lessor's claims.67 However, the
ability to avoid payments on antecedent debts merits mention, and reinforces the
notion that prejudgment interest should not incorporate the promisee's short-
term default risk. Where a payment is made on an antecedent debt within ninety
days of the filing of a bankruptcy petition, subject to certain exceptions, the
trustee is permitted to avoid the payment.68 In Example 3, if performance is
rendered by C, B's ability to retain payment in full nevertheless remains subject
to being reclaimed in the short-term. One might more generally state that the
promisee has, at Time 0, priced-in the short-term default risk of the promisor as
of Time 1 - the time performance is to be due. Only an increase in that default
risk, arising from postponement of payment following litigation, would be
required to reflect what is the likely computational basis of the initial bargain.
For example, litigation of a claim might take three years. At the time
performance was due, lenders to the promisor might require a 3% premium for
the risk associated with a short-term, e.g., sixty day, loan and a 5% premium for
risk associated with a three-year loan.6 9 If, by litigating, the promisor postpones
payment for three years, the promisee has assumed an additional risk, arising
from the postponement of payment. That is a second-order adjustment to the
risk of contracting, 70 and is unlikely to be reflected in initial pricing. For
67 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (2000) (limiting claim for termination of a lease of real property to
the greater of rent for one year or fifteen percent of the remaining term, up to three years).
68 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)-(c) (2000) (subject to increase where the creditor is an insider).
69 Cf Knoll, supra note 2, at 320 (noting, "[Tihe more quickly a bond is repaid, the greater
the likelihood of full repayment.").
70 At the time of contracting, a "first-order" effect on the value the promisee expects arises
from the probability the promisor will be insolvent at the time performance is due. This possible
increase in default risk, arising from litigation allowing postponement of performance, is a
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prejudgment interest to be truly compensatory, in the illustration, only the
additional two percentage point (5% - 3%) increase in default premium should
be reflected in prejudgment interest. For this reason, one can in part reject the
view expressed by Keir and Keir, that prejudgment interest reflecting default
risk by the promisor should not be provided where the underlying claim
is legal.71
This factor is one that complicates relative rights among contract and tort
claimants. Although in some cases a tort claimant may have a pre-existing
contractual relationship whose pricing could reflect the possibility of default,
e.g., claims of conversion against a bailee, a tort claimant frequently will not
have had the opportunity to have incorporated the tortfeasor's default rate.72
There are complex policy choices associated with allocation of default risk
among tort claimants and contract claimants. If one were of the view that, as the
tort claimant was not previously compensated for any default risk of the
promisor, and therefore the entire default risk should be reflected in its
prejudgment interest, that would reallocate value among tort and contract
claimants. The reallocation could be dramatic where the tortfeasor was in dire
financial circumstances.
B. Short-Term Rate vs. Extendable Rate
In identifying the promisee' s cost of funds for purposes of determining the
fully compensatory prejudgment interest, the rate for a traditional term loan
might not be the proper reference. Knoll argues for referencing the short-term
rate.73 He asserts referencing a long-term rate will inhibit settlement, as a
variation in interest rate will allocate to one party or the other a preference to
postpone judgment.74 He also asserts that the normal reason why long-term
interest rates exceed those of short-term rates is that there is a liquidity
preference.75 He then asserts, "[b]ecause prejudgment interest is calculated ex
post, there is no risk that interest rates will later change. Accordingly,
prejudgment interest should be calculated using a very short-term rate, which
does not contain a premium for interest rate risk.
' 76
conditional refinement, arising only if there is a default. "Second-order" here means a small
refinement to an initial adjustment.
71 See Kier & Kier, supra note 8, at 140-41; supra note 35 and accompanying text.
72 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
73 Knoll, supra note 2, at 317-18.74 Id. at 318.
75 Id. at 318-19.
76 Id. at 319 (footnote omitted). The article later provides a mechanism to account for
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That argument is difficult to follow. If we conceive of prejudgment interest
as reflecting a forced investment and long-term rates being higher to account for
liquidity preference, the fact that interest rates can be computed ex post does not
eliminate the fact that this forced investment has deprived the promisee of
liquidity to which it was entitled. The fact that there was ajudgment, on which
the interest is computed, makes clear that the promisee was, in fact, entitled to
the liquidity.
In some ways this looks like a short-term loan that is extendable - a loan
whose maturity the promisor has the option to extend (which can alternatively
be conceived of as a long-term loan subject to prepayment without penalty).
Such an option is valuable, and would produce a higher interest rate than a
short-term loan with a fixed maturity date.
VI. SALE OF THE CLAIM - FUNDING COVER WITH A SECURED LOAN
The preceding examples compute the impact of breach on the assumption
that a covering transaction is funded with unsecured debt. Additional nuance is
provided to the analysis by considering the possibility that the promisee may
either sell the claim or fund a covering transaction with debt secured by
the claim.
If the promisee could sell the claim without transaction costs, the promisee
would be fully compensated were the claim to bear prejudgment interest at a rate
reflecting the increased default risk arising from postponement of payment and
the risk-free rate for a loan over the period until judgment.77 Omitted are (i) any
factor reflecting the promisee' s cost of funds and (ii) the promisor' s short-term
default risk, which is best viewed as already being priced into the amount of the
claim. The promisee's cost of funds is not relevant, because the ability to resell
the claim freely would allow it to realize its expected value independent of the
promisee's default risk (its cost of funds). Part V develops the reasons for
omission of the promisor' s short-term default risk.
Limiting prejudgment interest to an amount based on the risk-free rate plus
the increased default risk arising from postponement of payment provides
properly computed prejudgment reflecting the claim as a liquid asset. Whether
that model is accurate depends on the kind of claim in question. Pertinent
factors include whether transaction costs would predominate in any attempt to
default risk of the promisor. Id. at 325.
77 Cf. Patell et al., supra note 29, at 342 (referencing claim bearing interest at the
defendant's debt rate).
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sell the claim to a third party and whether the jurisdiction makes sale of the
claim unlawful, e.g., as champertous. For example, UCC § 9-406(f)78 renders
ineffective other statutory provisions or regulations that would prohibit the sale
of a claim that is an "account,, 79 although perhaps the most prominent
jurisdiction for this purpose, New York, modified Article 9 in enactment to
eliminate this provision.8°
Whether it is desirable for a jurisdiction to seek to provide different levels of
prejudgment interest based on the liquidity of the claim depends on empirical
evidence, such as the relative frequencies and amounts of the different types of
claims (liquid or illiquid) and the relative importance of transaction costs. In the
absence of that empirical evidence, no recommendation is made here between
two choices: (i) disregarding the possible sale of the claim and (ii) providing
prejudgment interest varying depending on the nature of the claim. Judgment,
albeit one without empirical backing, suggests that one can reject, however, as
being the best estimate of properly compensatory prejudgment interest,
providing prejudgment interest in all cases based on an assumption of free resale
of the claim. It does not seem likely that circumstance predominates.
One may also consider whether the promisee's cost of funds should be
based on a secured loan. One might consider either a secured loan having only
the claim as collateral or a secured loan additionally having other assets as
collateral. As to the latter case, a decrease in the promisee's cost of funds
arising from creation of a security interest in the promisee's assets other than the
claim itself can be rejected out of hand. Funding a covering transaction with
that collateral represents a decrease in the promisee's liquidity that likely was
not bargained-for. Similar to the discussion above, 8 it is possible for parties, at
the time of contracting, to have contemplated a possibility such as the promisee
78 U.C.C. § 9-406(f) (2001).
79 The term "account" is defined in U.C.C. § 9-102(2), as "a right to payment of a monetary
obligation, whether or not earned by performance" in connection with eight enumerated
circumstances, e.g., "for property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or
otherwise disposed of." One of the exclusions concerns commercial tort claims, Id. Rights
under other contracts would be "general intangibles." U.C.C. § 9-102(42). The abrogation of
existing law concerning assignments of general intangibles is more limited. See U.C.C. § 9-
408(c), (d).
0 N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-406 (McKinney 2002). See generally Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First
Fid. Bank, 731 N.E.2d 581, 587 (N.Y. 2000) ("[un order to constitute champertous conduct in
the acquisition of rights that would then be nullified and to resolve the question at issue, the
foundational intent to sue on that claim must at least have been the primary purpose for, if not the
sole motivation behind, entering into the transaction.").
81 See supra, Part V.
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funding a covering transaction with a loan secured in all the promisee's assets.
However, it seems unlikely that would be the basis on which a transaction
ordinarily would be priced. The promisee would need to charge more for that
potential loss of liquidity. However, because the loss of liquidity would only
arise after the other party's breach, it would be difficult for the promisee to
price it.
As to the former case, involving a secured loan having only the claim as
collateral, if that claim could practicably be used to decrease the promisee's cost
of funds, that lower rate should be reflected in ascertaining fully compensatory
the prejudgment interest. If secured credit worked perfectly, for example, under
an arrangement involving a nonrecourse loan, properly compensatory
prejudgment interest in those cases would be similar to that where the promisee
had the ability to sell the claim outright. And Article 9 also has similar limits on
the extent to which other law may prevent the creation of a security interest in a
claim.82 Of course, for various reasons, secured credit does not work perfectly,
and a secured loan to the promisee might bear interest at a rate above that on the
underlying claim.83 And as in the case with an outright sale of the claim,
intuition, albeit one not reinforced with empirical evidence, suggests the
transaction costs - particularly the cost of obtaining information concerning
possible defenses to the claim - frequently would substantially inhibit the
efficient funding of a covering transaction with a loan secured by the claim
in default.
VII. CONCLUSION
The legal literature examining computation of fully compensatory
prejudgment interest provides persuasive rationales that nevertheless reach
contradictory conclusions. Focusing on contract claims between large
businesses, this paper primarily develops two principles allowing selection
among those analyses.
82 U.C.C. § 9-406(f), 9-408(c)-(d) (2001). See generally Marsha E. Simms, Introduction to
Secured Lending and Commercial Finance, in ASSET BASED FINANCING 2004, at 9, 26-29 (PLI
Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 864, 2004) (discussing the benefits of
having a security interest in a general intangible notwithstanding that other statutory provisions
limit its enforcement against the obligor under that general intangible).
83 See generally, e.g., 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.05[2][c] (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2004) (noting "a plan may be confirmed against a secured
creditor's wishes if the plan provides 'for the realization by such holders of the indubitable
equivalent of such claims.' " (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2000))).
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First, prejudgment interest is not fully compensatory if it allows a promisor,
in breach, to reallocate value among the promisee and the promisee' s creditors.
For this reason, one can reject the argument that prejudgment interest at the
promisor's cost of funds is necessarily fully compensatory. However, providing
prejudgment interest necessary to keep the promisee whole may result in
additional value being transferred from the promisor to the promisee's creditors,
in order to assure the promisee itself is made whole.
Second, prejudgment interest that reflects the promisor' s short-term default
risk, at the time performance becomes due, likely produces double-counting in
prejudgment interest for contract claimants. The risk of the promisor's
insolvency likely will have already been priced-in, but not the partially-
offsetting possibility that the promisor will default, the promisee will bring a
lawsuit and, in the lawsuit, be able to increase its award based on the promisor' s
risk premium at the time of default (or law suit initiation, if that is when
prejudgment interest starts in the particular jurisdiction). It likely will be too
complex for the promisee to ascribe a value to that partially-
offsetting possibility.
Applying these principles yields the conclusion that fully compensatory
prejudgment interest would be based on (i) any incremental increase in default
risk arising from the promisor' s postponement of payment by litigation and (ii)
the promisee's cost of funds (subject to additional detail-intensive nuance
depending on whether the claim could either be sold or be the subject of a valid
security interest, and on the transaction costs associated with either). This
analysis allows a more thoughtful policy choice in the setting of
prejudgment interest.
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